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Symposium—Judicial Independence and Legal
Infrastructure: Essential Partners for Economic Development
The Role of Judicial Independence
Brian K. Landsberg*
I. A DEFINITION FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Papers today from scholars and prominent high court judges reflect enormous
breadth in describing judicial independence. I believe that if one begins to talk about
the effect of “judicial independence” on economic development, there should be an
agreement on the definition of that term. It is not clear to me that the papers contain
such a definition. They do state a number of factors that people think are relevant
to judicial independence. It seems that two kinds of definitions may have
emerged: an institutional-type definition, and a performance-based definition.
A. Institutional-type Definition of Judicial Independence
One definition of judicial independence may be referred to as an institutional
definition: a judge’s immunity from external pressures. This is the position that is
taken in Daniel Klerman and Paul Mahoney’s article. In brief, the article states:
A fully independent judiciary is one in which judges enjoy tenure during
good behavior, a salary sufficient to shield them from pressure from
either government or private parties, sufficient prestige that the hope of
promotion to a more prominent post is not a large motivator, a system of
perquisites . . . that is hard for the government to manipulate, and rules
regarding jurisdiction over cases that are resistant to executive and
1
legislative meddling, among others.
Today’s papers embrace aspects of this definition of judicial independence.
Professor Klerman also referred to the definition of judicial independence
proffered by Feld and Voight as “the amount of discretion that judges have at
2
their disposal vis-a-vis representatives of other government branches.” This
definition emphasizes the horizontal separation of powers among coordinate
branches of government.
* Professor of Law, University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.A., J.D., University of
California, Berkeley.
1. See Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from
Eighteenth Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005).
2. See Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country
Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators (CESifo Working Papers No. 906 at 3, 2003), available at
http//ssrn.com/absratct=395403.
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Both Justice Jing Liu and Deputy President Sam Rugege have raised the
question of how the tradition of coordination in their countries relates to judicial
independence.
In addition, Wang Juan has raised another structural or institutional type of
issue, namely independence within the judicial system, or what might be called
vertical independence. What implications arise when a lower court seeks advice
from a higher court? That seems to be an interference with judicial independence.
But to some extent, does it depend on whether systemic independence or
individual judges is at issue? The papers seemed mixed on this point—some talk
about a system of judicial independence, and others talk about how individual
judges act. Certainly, a lower court judge who is seeking advice from a higher
court is not going to feel independent after receiving that advice. But, does that
mean the system is not one of judicial independence?
Another structural issue pinpointed by Judge Callahan concerned the U.S.
Supreme Court’s review of Marbury v. Madison;3 so, when judicial independence
is discussed in this country, this entails the independence to decide the
4
constitutionality of controversial issues. Cases like McCullough v. Maryland and
5
Dred Scott v. Sandford were certainly controversial, and judges were vetted for
how they felt about those cases during their judicial confirmation. But, how does
the very political nature of the appointment and confirmation process in the
United States affect the notion of judicial independence?
B. Performance-based Definition of Judicial Independence
The other kind of definition of judicial independence is a performance-based
meaning: judicial independence is a function of a judge’s behavior. The judicial
system seeks judges who act neutral and base their actions on law and facts.
There seems to be wide agreement with that proposition in the abstract.
Relatedly, the judicial system also seeks predictability. Intuitively, one would
think that economic actors would be more interested in predictability than any
other aspect of judicial independence.
The one thing that the participants of the symposium6 seemed to agree on
was that judicial independence does not mean freedom from all accountability.
Justices Liu and Rugege mentioned the importance of having a code of ethics.
Judge Callahan referred to this as internal accountability.
There are also a number of ways that the judicial system, as a whole, is held
accountable. The power of the purse has been mentioned. For example, if the
public shows disapproval of a judge’s behavior, a number of repercussions may

3. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
5. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
6. Symposium, Judicial Independence and Legal Infrastructure: Essential Partners for Economic
Development at the McGeorge School of Law (October 28, 2005).
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result, such as freezing a judge’s salary, reducing a judge’s support staff, or
limiting the number of judicial positions, which may create jams in the court
system. Consequently, a lot can be done to make life miserable for judges.
Another way of determining what is meant by judicial independence is to ask
why such independence is wanted, and see if a definition comes from that
direction. Once that question is answered, the definition of judicial independence
should be ascertained.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMICS, PREDICTABILITY,
AND NEUTRALITY
Do economic actors want neutrality, or would they be satisfied with
predictability? Once matters have deteriorated to the point that parties have to go
to court, every economic actor wants the court to rule in its favor more than it
wants neutrality. While predictability may help economic actors make rational
investment decisions, anti-investment courts would discourage, rather than
encourage, some economic activity. So perhaps predictability and neutrality are
linked to the definition of judicial independence. If judges really are neutral, then
litigants should be able to look at the law and facts, and predict the outcome of a
case in advance and should not have to go to court. They ought to be able to
settle a case.
For many years, I worked in enforcement of the federal civil rights laws in
the deep South, and I could certainly predict what some judges were going to do;
it was not pretty. Many judges were predictable. They would virtually always
rule against the person seeking vindication of the right to be free from
discrimination. Even though they were predictable, these judges certainly were
not neutral. It is worth noting that prior to the 1970s, the deep South was at the
bottom of the economic rung in this country. The economy of that region has
improved markedly since then. Is this improvement possibly linked in part to the
fact that the end of the segregation era has freed judges to become more
independent?
Deputy President Rugege underscored a very important point about the
economic issue that confronts underpaid judges. The American Bar Association
Journal published a story a few years ago about a U.S. federal judge who went to
Cambodia to lecture on corruption. He went to a provincial court to discuss how
terrible corruption was. After he finished his talk, one of the provincial judges
raised his hand and asked the judge his salary, and the federal judge told him.
U.S. federal judges make a living wage with pretty good perks and the federal
judiciary attracts very highly-qualified candidates. By contrast, the Cambodian
provincial judge said he could not feed his family on his salary. It is important to
stress that there will be no judicial independence as long as judges have to
determine how to support their family. The answer, of course, is pretty clear. If
these judges are not getting paid by the state, they are going to get their money
elsewhere. Anyone would do that for his or her family.
333
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It is also predictable that a judge whose decision depends upon the good
graces of the government is going to rule in favor of those who are in power.
Perhaps in thinking about judicial independence and economic development, the
analysis should split between cases involving the government and cases between
private actors. It seems conceivable that even in a system where the courts are
not independent vis-a-vis the government, they could be independent vis-a-vis
private actors. That is, the government may, in order to promote economic
development, wish to have most economic development cases decided neutrally.
At the same time, however, the government may wish to maintain tighter
control over other types of cases. For example, in times of crisis, all governments
are prone to impose stricter controls on human behavior and even seek judicial
cooperation in doing so. Additionally in one-party states, the party will want the
courts to help stamp out challenges to its hegemony. This was the case, for
example, in the deep South through the middle of the twentieth century. There
are many signs that this is the case in modern China. Conversely, one might
argue that a court is either independent or not, and there is no in-between.
A court system may be also neutral without being entirely predictable.
Predictability depends in part on a system of precedent. If a court decides each case
without reference to what has happened in other courts or cases, predictability
suffers. Predictability also requires a measure of judicial competence. Incompetent
judges are unlikely to be up to the task of fully understanding the facts and the law
(even in simple cases), and certainly are not capable of unraveling complex
economic transnational issues.
What is meant by neutrality? Here, one might turn to a set of principles from
the United Nations. The Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Defenders adopted three basic principles regarding
the independence of the judiciary, which were endorsed by the General Assembly
in 1985 in two different resolutions. The first basic principle says that “[t]he
independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the state and enshrined in
the constitution or the law of the country.”7 I gather that this is the case in most
countries. That is what Judge Rugege referred to as de jure independence. The
next basic principle declares: “The judiciary shall decide matters before them
impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any
restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.”8 Moreover, the third
principle states that “[t]he judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a
judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue
submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law.”9

7. See e.g., Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, NY TIMES, Dec. 28,
2005 at A1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Note that these principles not only apply to structure, but also to what courts
actually do—they must act impartially. These principles require courts to have
jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature. In the United States, the executive
or legislative branch has attempted to remove some matters from the jurisdiction
of the judiciary. In China, issues concerning the constitutionality of statutes are
not decided by the courts; they are decided by the Council of the People’s
Congress. These issues are not supposed to be decided by the courts. Does that
mean that there is no judicial independence? Not necessarily. Courts may be
independent enough to decide other issues even if they are not independent as to
those issues. The jurisdiction of independent courts over the constitutionality of
government action seems central to the concept of the rule of law. So the
question is whether there can be judicial independence without rule of law.
One final point emerges from Judge Callahan’s remarks: the distinction
between judicial independence and a lack of accountability. Judges are, at the
very least, accountable to the law. As Justice Cardozo explained, “[t]he judge,
even when he is free, is still not wholly free.”10 A judge must internalize the
traditions of proper adjudication. Accountability to the law presupposes
transparency, which promotes both neutrality and predictability. Lower courts are
also accountable to appellate courts. An independent judiciary may include layers
of appellate review that take away the independence of lower court judges.
Electoral accountability is more problematic. Can it be said that a judge whose
ability to be re-elected depends on how she rules on a controversial issue is
independent?
III. CONCLUSION
In short, judicial independence can be generally defined in terms of
freedom—indeed responsibility—to rule based on the facts and the law, and thus
free from undue external restraints. This definition of judicial independence can
accommodate both common law and civil law traditions. But within that
definition lurks many ambiguities. As scholars seek to determine the link, if any,
between judicial independence and economic development, they need first to
develop a solid definition of judicial independence. The papers delivered at this
conference provide a solid base for doing so.

10.
1921).

See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (Yale University Press
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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial independence is a universally recognized principle in democratic
societies. It is a prerequisite for a society to operate on the basis of the rule of
law. It is essential for the purpose of maintaining public confidence in the
judiciary. As once stated by the Chief Justice of Canada:
Judicial independence is valued because it serves important societal
goals. . . . One of the goals is the maintenance of public confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the effectiveness of

* Supreme Court of Rwanda. Paper presented at the Judicial Independence and Legal Infrastructure:
Essential Partners for Economic Development conference, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law,
Sacramento, California, October 28, 2005.
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the court system. Independence contributes to the perception that justice
will be done in individual cases. Another societal goal served by judicial
independence is the maintenance of the rule of law, one aspect of which
is the constitutional principal that the exercise of all public power must
find its ultimate source in a legal rule.1
Various international instruments further stress the importance of judicial
2
independence, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
3
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In particular, the United
Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary states:
“[i]ndependence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined
in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental
4
and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.”
What is involved in the concept of judicial independence? One approach to
the independence of the judiciary is to divide it in two parts: (a) institutional
independence; and (b) personal independence.
A. Institutional Independence
Institutional independence refers to independence of the judiciary from other
branches of government—that is, the legislature and the executive. This aspect is
further expressed through the principle of separation of powers. A branch of
government should not place pressure on or influence another branch of
government to act in certain ways. However, the independence of the judiciary,
rather than the executive or the legislative branch, is frequently discussed
because the judiciary is more vulnerable to pressure or influence.
The judiciary makes decisions that might negatively affect the executive or
legislature. For instance, it may declare an act of a government official to be
unconstitutional, unlawful, or outside the scope of the official’s powers. It may
also declare a law passed by the legislature to be unconstitutional and of no force
or effect. The judiciary has no means of enforcing its decisions without the
assistance of the other branches of government. On the other hand, the executive
and the legislature may play a crucial role in the appointment of judges and in
determining their remuneration and conditions of service in a way that, if not
circumscribed by law, may jeopardize the judiciary’s independence in doing its
work. The other branches of government may also undermine the institutional
independence of the judiciary through budgetary measures and through the

1. Reference re Public Sector Pay Reduction Act [1997] 150 D.L.R. 577, 593 (Can.)
2. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
3. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art 14, Dec. 19,
1999, 999 U.N.T.S. 17.
4. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Seventh United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 121/22Rev.1 at 59 (1985).
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administration of courts. This is why many constitutions, in addition to providing
for the separation of powers, establish the financial and administrative
independence of the judiciary. This is intended to enable the courts to prepare
and administer their budgets without undue pressure, especially from the
executive. This sometimes requires that judges’ salaries shall be determined by
an independent body that is not aligned with the government and that reports to
the head of state or the legislature, which in turn puts the proposals of the
independent body into force.5
B. Personal Independence
Personal independence refers to the impartiality of a judge; that is, the
judge’s ability to make a decision without fear, favor, or prejudice with regard to
the parties irrespective of their position in society—it means the absence of bias.
The judge should be able to resist intimidation or influence, whether pressure
stems from governmental power, politics, religion, money, friendship, prejudice,
6
or other inducements. Decisions should only be based on the facts and the law. It
has been said that personal independence is protected by three things: (1) security
of tenure, usually ensured by a constitutional provision that a judge may only be
dismissed for good cause such as gross misconduct or gross incompetence; (2)
decent remuneration and conditions of service (i.e., financial security); and (3)
immunity from civil liability for loss caused by performance of judicial duties.7
However, personal independence is also supported by the existence and
enforcement of a code of ethics for judges and other court personnel.
In many African and other developing countries, there has not always been
respect for the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. Judges have been
intimidated into giving rulings favorable to the government, forced to resign their
positions, and in the worst cases, they have been killed. For instance, the first
Ugandan Chief Justice, Benedicto Kiwanuka, was murdered by the Amin regime
for not cooperating with the regime’s illegal actions.8 In 2005, the Ugandan
government sent armed personnel to surround the High Court. In a statement,
Chief Justice Odoki said that the judges considered the siege of the High Court as

5. See PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, LATIMER HOUSE GUIDELINES FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH, ¶ 1 (June 19, 1998), available at http://www.cpahq.org/uploadstore/docs/latmrhse.pdf#
search=%22the%20latimer%20house%20guidelines%20for%20the%20commonwealth%20 (stating that “[a]s a
matter of principle, judicial salaries and benefits should be set by an independent body and their value should be
maintained”).
6. See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 4, ¶ 2.
7. See IAN CURRIE & JOHAN DEWAAL, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 301-305
(Juta & Company Ltd. 2001).
8. See Monica Twesiime-Kirya, The Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary in Uganda:
Opportunities and Challenges, in THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE RULE OF LAW:
STRENGTHENING CONSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM IN EAST AFRICA 22 (Frederick W. Jjuuko ed., 2005) (giving a
brief history of the struggle between the judiciary and the executive in Uganda).
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an apparent attempt to intimidate the judiciary. Military personnel were deployed
within the precincts of the court to re-arrest suspects that the High Court had
lawfully released on bail. The Chief Justice said that the judges considered the
November 16 siege of the High Court as threatening to undermine the
independence of the judiciary and the rule of law.9 Justice Ogola called the siege
a “horrendous onslaught” and “a grotesque violation of the twin doctrines of the
10
rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.”
In 2001, the Chief Justice and a number of senior judges from Zimbabwe
were harassed and forced to resign for attempting to uphold the rule of law and
citizens’ rights with respect to the seizure of white farms by the Mugabe regime.11
A recent report by Amnesty International indicates that the harassment of the
judiciary continues, where “Zimbabwe’s crisis over the rule of law, triggered by
repeated flouting of court orders, harassment of judicial officers and
politicization of police remains unresolved.”12
In Swaziland, the High Court judges were harassed for the way they handled
a case involving the King and his teenage fiancée, his soon-to-be tenth wife. The
judges were issued instructions from the Royal Palace to drop the case or resign.
The judges, however, defied the instruction.13
Thus, the executive has sometimes not taken kindly to the judiciary resisting
undue influence. However, it is also true that a number of judges, once pressured,
will succumb to the pressure, and a few, especially in the lower rungs of the
judiciary, used their positions to enrich themselves through selling favors to
litigants, which undermines the efficacy of the justice system.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
It is now well-recognized that the rule of law and an independent judiciary
promote stability in a country. When citizens feel that the courts can resolve their

9. See Herbert Ssempogo, Odoki Condemns Military Presence at Court, THE NEW VISION, Nov. 18
2005; see also Joel Ogwang, Odoki Warns on State Intimidation, THE MONITOR, Nov. 29, 2005.
10. Emma Mutaizibwa, Government Accuses Judges of Supporting Dr Besigye, THE MONITOR,
December 24, 2005.
11. See David Bean, Life, Death and Justice, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 3, 2002, at 13 (quoting Chief
Justice Gubby: “Most disturbing was the harassment of the High Court and Supreme Court judges by war
veterans. They called on the judges to resign or face removal by force. The Minister of Information spearheaded
the campaign by accusing the Supreme Court of being biased in favor of white farmers at the expense of the
land less majority. The invasion of the Supreme Court building on the morning of 24 November 2000 by close
to 200 war veterans and followers was disgraceful. It sent a clear message that the rule of law would not be
respected. Not a word was heard from the President, the Minister of Justice or the Attorney General.”).
12. See Amnesty International, Zimbabwe: An Assessment of Human Rights Violations in the Run-Up to
the March 2005 Parliamentary Elections, Mar. 15, 2005, at 1, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library
/index/ENGAFR460032005?open&of=ENG-ZWE.
13. See generally Voice of America News, Swazi Judge Defies King’s Order to Drop Abduction Case,
FEDERAL INFORMATION NEWS DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2002.
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disputes impartially and fairly, and that the state will enforce the decisions of the
courts, they are more inclined to obey the law. There is no incentive for those
unhappy with government to take the law into their own hands and to disturb the
peace. In turn, political stability encourages investment and hence development.
As pointed out by the Asian Development Bank:
The cornerstone of successful reform is the effective independence of the
judiciary. That is a prerequisite for an impartial, efficient and reliable
judicial system. Without judicial independence, there can be no rule of
law, and without the rule of law the conditions are not in place for the
efficient operation of an open economy, so as to ensure conditions of
legal security and foreseeability.14
No one, whether local or foreign, wants to invest in a country that is
politically unstable or where there is no confidence in the justice system, as
investors would not be assured of a fair return on their investment. Respect for
the law on the part of the state and the impartial enforcement of contracts and
other transactions give investors the confidence to do business in the country.
There is increased predictability of what the results of a legal dispute will be if
one party does not perform their obligation. The rule of law and independence of
the judiciary protect both personal safety and property, while enabling people to
go about their normal business. As investment creates jobs, it reduces poverty
and enhances standards of living and the well-being of the population, which
development is all about.
After discussing the importance of judicial independence in the resolution of
conflicts between contracting parties (e.g., between government and citizens)
with respect to the protection of property rights, Feld and Voigt argue:
Among the many functions of government, the reduction of uncertainty
is of paramount importance. But the law will only reduce uncertainty if
the citizens can expect the letter of the law to be followed by government
representatives. An independent judiciary could thus also be interpreted
as a device to turn promises—e.g. to respect property rights and abstain
from expropriation—into credible commitments. If it functions like this,
citizens will develop a longer time horizon which will lead to more
investments in physical capital but also to a higher degree of
specialization, i.e., to a different structure of human capital. All this
means that [judicial independence] is expected to be conducive to
economic growth.15

14. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 2 (2001), available at http://www.asiandevbank.org/Documents/Others/Law_
ADB/1pr_2001.asp?p=lawdevt.
15. Lars .P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence
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Of course, it may be argued that property may be protected even where the
judiciary is not independent; for instance, through a government policy that
encourages investment and is firmly against expropriation. Contractual disputes
may be channeled to arbitration and mediation, thus bypassing a judiciary that is
not independent, or contracts may be honored by parties to protect their
reputations. However, even if one agrees that judicial independence is not a
prerequisite for economic growth, in my view it is indisputably an important
factor for economic growth. Since judicial independence is based on the law, it is
the most reliable guarantor of protection of economic measures and their
enforcement.16
Uganda is again a good example of how economic growth can be influenced
by the rule of law and judicial independence. When Amin expelled the Asians in
1972 and distributed their property among his henchmen and supporters, the
economy virtually collapsed. No investments were coming in, and Ugandans
with property felt insecure, which forced many of them to leave the country.
Amin introduced military courts and economic crime tribunals that took over
many functions of the ordinary courts. There was no rule of law and judicial
independence was at its lowest ebb, with a chief justice and many lawyers
murdered by state agents. When, however, the National Resistance Movement
restored order and the rule of law in the mid-1980s and 1990s, investors returned
to Uganda and the economy quickly recovered. An independent judiciary
substantially contributed to this recovery.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN RWANDA
The Constitution of Rwanda of 2003 guarantees the independence of the
judiciary. Article 140 enshrines institutional independence as follows:
The Judiciary is independent and separate from the Legislative and the
Executive branches of government. It enjoys financial and administrative
17
autonomy.
Judicial decisions are binding on all parties concerned be they public
authorities or individuals. They shall not be challenged except through
ways and procedures determined by law.18

Using a New Set of Indicators, 4 (CESifo Working Paper No. 906 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=395403.
16. Daniel Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development, 19 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 427 (2007).
17. RWANDA CONST. OF 2003 ch. V, sect. 1, art. 140, ¶ 2.
18. Id. ¶ 5.
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Article 142, on the other hand, guarantees personal independence. It requires
impartiality on the part of judges and deals with their security of tenure and their
terms and conditions of service. It states: “[i]n the exercise of their functions,
judges follow the law and only the law.”19 It further states that unless the law
provides otherwise, judges confirmed in office shall hold life tenure. They cannot
be suspended or transferred, even for the purposes of promotion, retired
prematurely, or otherwise removal from office. For instance, the provision refers to
a situation where the law provides procedures for suspension or dismissal in case
of serious misconduct. The Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice may only be
removed from office on account of undignified behavior, incompetence, or serious
professional misconduct upon petition of three-fifths of either the Chamber of
Deputies or Senate and a two-thirds majority vote of each Chamber.20 Thus, they
enjoy considerable protection. According to the Law on the Status of Judges and
Other Court Personnel, judges may only be dismissed due to the following reasons:
serious misconduct; serious incompetence; or an inability to perform judicial duties
for reasons other than illness if, after disciplinary proceedings, such is found to be
the case by the Superior Council of the Judiciary.21
The appointment process of judges has a bearing on their independence. The
Constitution only discusses the appointment of the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief
Justice, and the judges of the Supreme Court. Although the ordinary judges of the
Supreme Court are appointed for life, subject to a retirement age, the Chief Justice
and Deputy Chief Justice are appointed for a nonrenewable term of eight years.
They are appointed by the President after consultation with the cabinet, the
Superior Council of the Judiciary, and an election by the Senate. The judges of all
other courts are appointed by the Superior Council of the Judiciary after
competition through tests and interviews organized by the Council.22 Thus, for all
judges, except those of the Supreme Court, the executive has no role in their
appointment, which is an important indicator of independence. For the leadership
of the judiciary and judges of the Supreme Court, it is understandable that the
executive and the Senate should be involved as the Supreme Court sets the
direction and policy of the judiciary.
Another important element is that the Constitution provides for the
composition of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, which is responsible for the
appointment, promotion, and discipline of judicial personnel. The Council is
chaired by the Chief Justice and is dominated by judges representing the different
levels of courts. Only four out of thirty-two members are appointed from outside

19. RWANDA CONST. OF 2003 ch. V, sect. 1, art. 142.
20. Id. at art. 147.
21. Law on the Statutes for Judges and Other Judicial Personnel, Law No. 6bis/2004, art. 78. This is in
accordance with international standards. For instance, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary state: “[j]udges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behavior
that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.” Supra note 4.
22. RWANDA CONST. OF 2003 ch. V, sect. 1, art. 15.
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the judiciary: the President of the National Human Rights Commission, the
Ombudsman, and two Deans of Law elected by law faculties. The Council is
therefore rightly seen as independent. However, there has been criticism that the
Council is not sufficiently representative of the broader society, as a public
institution should be. Neither the parliament nor the Bar Association are
represented. It is argued that there is a risk of judges protecting each other and not
being sufficiently objective in matters affecting them. On the other hand, the
current composition of the Council is probably preferable to the South African
Judicial Service Commission (“JSC”), which includes ten members of parliament,
the Minister of Justice, and four nominees of the President. The majority on the
JSC comprises persons from other branches of government.23 This has been
criticized as likely to unduly influence the appointment of judges. However, in the
case of post-apartheid South Africa, this composition of the JSC is necessary to
bring about the transformation of a judiciary dominated by white conservative
males.24 A midway position may be preferable for Rwanda.
IV. MEASURES TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
AND ITS ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT
A. The Fight Against Corruption
A judiciary that is not impartial is susceptible to corruption, and where the
judiciary is known to be corrupt, there is no predictability of the results of
disputes. This leads to a lack of confidence in the legal system and potential
investors are discouraged. Thus, an independent judiciary that is free from
corruption is crucial for economic development.
At the same time, an independent judiciary is one which has the courage to
fight corruption, which must be severely punished, irrespective of the political or
social status of the culprit. Severe punishments for corruption are bound to
dissuade potential bribe-givers and takers from continuing to distort the
25
economy. Effective justice will, in turn, lead to confidence in the system and
encourage developmental investments.

23. SOUTH AFRICA CONST. art. 178, ¶ 1.
24. CURRIE & DEWALL, supra note 7, at 301-05.
25. In a recent South Africa case, State v. Yengeni, the judges demonstrated the need for severe
punishment for corruption. The accused, a Member of Parliament, received nearly a 50% discount on a
Mercedes Benz 4x4 arranged by a representative of a bidder in a government-arms procurement process. He
was convicted and sentenced to four years of imprisonment. On appeal, the public prosecutor sought to have the
sentence reduced to an 18-month suspended jail term. The presiding judge said that “[t]his is not only an
economic crime, but undermines the faith the public has in the government.” Referring to this and other cases
where members of parliament had been given noncustodial sentences for fraud, the judge asked the prosecutor,
“So you honestly think these kinds of sentences send out a message that the administration of justice serves to
deter elected officials caught with their fingers in the till?” See Mariette Le Roux, State Grilled on Sentences for
Corrupt Officials, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Oct. 3, 2005, available at http://www.mg.co.za/article
Page.aspx?articleid=252641&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news_national/.
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In the past, many developing countries have been notoriously corrupt in all
sectors of society and government. This is partly because of the lack of political
will to fight corruption, but also because of a lack of institutional mechanisms to
investigate and punish corruption. Today, however, a number of countries,
including Rwanda, are doing their best to fight against and punish corruption.
Laws have been passed and institutional mechanisms have been put in place for
the enforcement of the law. In Rwanda, an anticorruption law was passed.26 The
Office of Ombudsman, created by the Constitution, was also created in 2003. The
responsibilities of the Ombudsman include:
o

preventing and fighting injustice, corruption, and other related offenses
in public and private administration;

o

receiving and examining, in the aforementioned context, complaints
from individuals and independent associations against public officials or
organs, and private institutions in order to find solutions to such
complaints if they are well founded.27

Although the Office of Ombudsman is prohibited from involving itself in
matters before the courts, it may submit complaints it has received to the courts
or the prosecution. In such cases, those organs are required to respond to the
28
office. In this way, the Supreme Court has occasionally received
correspondence from the Office of Ombudsman with complaints about the
behavior of some judicial officers, but more often it is regarding delays in the
hearing of cases.
As it is often said, corruption is a two-way street, involving a giver and a
taker. Those who give bribes, to get favors or influence judgments in their favor,
must be discouraged and punished. There has been a sustained campaign by all
levels of government and the Office of Ombudsman to sensitize the population to
the evils of corruption and not shelter people involved in corruption and other
misconduct from justice. In 2005, the African Parliamentarians Network against
Corruption (“APNAC”) launched its branch in Rwanda,29 although Rwanda is not
on the APNAC’s list of corrupt countries.
There is also considerable international support for efforts to fight corruption
in developing countries. In Rwanda, these efforts include support from the World
Bank, the European Union, and U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), among others.

26. Law Aimed at Preventing, Suppressing, and Punishing Corruption and Related Offences, Law
No.24/2003 of 14/08/2003.
27. RWANDA CONST. OF 2003 ch. VIII, art. 182.
28. Law Establishing the Organization and Functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman, Law
No.25/2003 of 15/08/2003, art. 14.
29. See Rwanda News Agency, Anti-Corruption Parliament Body Launched in Rwanda, Jan. 10, 2005,
available at http://www.rwandagateway.org.article.php3?id_article=42.
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Before the 2003-2004 judicial reform in Rwanda, there was substantial
corruption among judges, court clerks, and other judicial officers. As a result of these
reforms, a number of measures were taken and institutional mechanisms were put in
place to combat corruption in the judiciary. First, there was a vetting exercise. The
employment of all judges and other court personnel was terminated, and a
recruitment exercise took place based on certain criteria. First, all potential judges
have to be legally qualified—they must have a minimum of a Bachelor of Laws
degree. Part of the problem causing corruption was that judges were not legally
qualified, and the temptation to make judicial decisions based on considerations other
than law was much higher. Second, they have to be persons of integrity. Those who
had a record of corruption or misconduct were excluded. Finally, in addition to the
rigorous selection process, there is now a Code of Ethics30 for judges that, among
other things, requires impartiality, integrity, and diligence. Article 7 states that “[i]n
particular a judge shall refrain from acts of corruption and other related offences and
fight against it in an exemplary manner.”
Judges and court personnel with a record of corruption are dismissed. The
Superior Council of the Judiciary has a committee on discipline which investigates
allegations of corruption and other forms of misconduct against judges and other
court personnel. Before a final decision is taken by the Council, the accused official
is given an opportunity to be heard.31
B. A Code of Ethics
In order to enhance the impartiality of judges in Rwanda, the Code of Ethics
requires judges to abstain from engaging in business and other activities that may
compromise their independence. Article 18 of the Code states: “[t]he functions of a
career judge shall be incompatible with political mandate, any management and any
other public or personal service, whether directly or by employing other people.”
This provision is understandably not popular with judges. They argue that since the
state cannot afford to pay them well, they should be allowed to supplement their
income through other income-generating activities like other, working people in the
public sector. However, it seems necessary to maintain this restriction on judges to
minimize the temptation of corruption.
C. Other Aspects of the Justice System that Have a Bearing on Development
1. Gacaca Courts
The Gacaca courts are adapted traditional courts involving local communities
that hear and decide genocide cases in Rwanda. Gacaca courts were introduced

30.
31.
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as specialized courts to deal specifically with genocide cases because there were
far too many genocide suspects for the regular courts to handle within a
reasonable time—hundreds of thousands of people were involved in crimes of
genocide, killing about a million people. It has been estimated that prosecuting
them through the regular courts would take about 200 years.
Gacaca courts have many advantages over regular courts, especially in the
context of the large number of suspects. These include:
(1) They are speedy. The procedure is simplified to make cases move
faster. There are no lawyers to raise objections on minor issues of
procedure. Judgments must be delivered on the day of completion of
the hearing or the day after. It is interesting to note that only twenty
cases were finalized by International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) in ten years. During 2000, ICTR rendered only four
judgments on the merits, but it made more than 200 interlocutory
decisions, including many rulings of the Appeals Chamber on
diverse procedural issues.32 The 2500 pages of law reports taken up
by these decisions show that a lot of work was indeed done by the
ICTR in 2000. However, in terms of dealing with the problem of the
number of genocide suspects awaiting trial or that still need to be
arrested, the work would never end following the ICTR process.
(2) They are less formal and not intimidating to witnesses. Anyone in the
community who can assist the tribunal to reach the truth is allowed
to speak. Thus there is a relaxed atmosphere that encourages people
to say what they know and what they saw. Consequently, the truth is
more likely to be told than in a cold, intimidating courtroom with
robed judges and attorneys who are determined to destroy the
credibility of witnesses through cross-examination.
(3) It is inexpensive for the state, victims, and witnesses. The trial takes
place in the local area where the offense was committed and where
the witnesses are likely to reside. Travel and other logistical
expenses incurred by state or individuals are minimal.
(4) Truth, forgiveness, and healing. In the Gacaca court, the perpetrator
is given the opportunity to acknowledge wrongdoing, tell the truth of
how the crime was committed, and ask for forgiveness. If this
happens, the convicted person is given a lesser sentence than he or
she would have otherwise received. If the victim or a relative is
present, they are able to confront the perpetrator. If forgiveness is
pled for, it may be given, creating a great chance for forgiveness,

32. UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, REPORTS OF ORDERS,
DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS (2000).
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healing, and reconciliation. If healing takes place, the victim is more
likely to be reintegrated into society and live a psychologically- and
economically-fit life.
The adjudication process is moving much faster than Western-style courts.
This means that suspects are getting out of prison in a much shorter period of
time and being reintegrated into society much faster. On the other hand, those
who lost their loved ones get back into “normal” life faster. Both sides are
reintegrated into useful economic activities that contribute to development.
2. Community Work
Laws implementing a program of community work as a part of the
punishment for genocide offenders have also been instrumental in creating
stability and a climate conducive to economic growth. The law provides that
persons convicted of crimes of genocide in the second and third categories—that
is, those who killed or damaged property but were not in leadership positions at
the time—get lesser sentences, and more importantly, serve half of their
sentences in community service activities if they confess to their crimes and
plead for forgiveness.33
The types of community work include: building and repairing rural roads;
repairing and maintaining public buildings; growing food for prisoners, orphans,
and indigents cared for by the state; and protecting the environment (e.g.,
planting forests and clearing rivers and lakes). Thus, perpetrators of genocide are
able to participate in the reconstruction of the country.
In carrying out community service, convicted perpetrators may even gain
valuable skills that can be applied after they are released. In general, the
punishment of community service is intended to ease the perpetrator back into
society, and therefore, to promote reconciliation, peaceful coexistence, and
avoidance of conflict, which leads to social and political stability. In turn, the
majority of people participate in productive and development-enhancing
economic activities.
D. Reform of Business Laws and Resolution of Commercial Disputes
A business law reform is currently underway in Rwanda to improve the legal
framework for economic development. A commission has been set up to study
the business law environment in Rwanda, to reform the laws, and to improve the
adjudication of commercial disputes in the courts as well as the use of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR)—both mediation and arbitration. Rwanda has very old

33. See Organic Law Establishing the Organization, Competence, and Functioning of Gacaca Courts,
art. 73 (charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes against
humanity, committed between October 1, 1990, and December 31, 1994).
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commercial laws, some dating back to nineteenth century Belgian laws or King’s
decrees, which must be replaced to bring Rwandan commercial transactions and
regulation into the twenty-first century.
The adjudicatory institutional set-up of commercial disputes is also under
review. Currently, commercial disputes are handled by specialized chambers of
provincial courts. This has not worked well due to congestion in provincial courts
and lack of expertise among judges. Consequently, there is a lack of confidence
in the courts within the business community, and if the situation continues, it
may become an impediment to investment and growth.
A new proposal for a stand-alone commercial court is being considered. Such
a court would be staffed by judges who have specialized training in modern
commercial law, who would ensure that commercial disputes are settled quickly
and efficiently. Judgments would be of a high standard and would form a body of
precedents that could be relied on by future courts. Rwanda will need the support
of developed countries; in particular, their expertise in training commercial court
judges to deliver judgments of an international standard.
V. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN RWANDA
In terms of de jure judicial independence, as already indicated, Rwanda has
sufficient constitutional and legal provisions providing for such independence.
However, it is always more difficult to assess the degree of de facto judicial
independence, especially in a country that has undergone constitutional and
judicial reforms in the past few years. Nevertheless, one can attempt to assess the
independence enjoyed by the Rwandan courts. As far as institutional
independence is concerned, Rwanda has a government that respects the principle
of the rule of law and that does not interfere in the judicial tasks of the courts. All
judges, including those at the lowest levels of the judiciary, have been sensitized
to their right, duty, and obligation to make their judicial decisions without
interference from other branches of government. It is important to stress this
because in the previous era, especially at the provincial and district levels,
authorities in the executive branch demanded and received reports of a judge’s
activities, and there were occasional attempts to influence the judge’s decisions.
Today, any such attempts by local authorities who may be unfamiliar with the
new approach are readily referred to the independence of the judiciary as
enshrined in the Constitution. In the higher courts, judges have not hesitated to
award substantial damages to citizens, where they have found that the
government caused harm by abuse of authority or negligence.34 The judiciary also
enjoys administrative and limited financial autonomy, as explained below.

34. See, e.g., Felly Kimeni, Milimo Payment for June, THE NEW TIMES, May 30, 2006, available at
http://www. newtimes.co.rw/index.php?option=_con_content&task+view&id=5096&Itemid=1. (on file with the
Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal).
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It is more difficult to gauge personal independence. What may be said is that
the judges know that they are free to decide cases before them impartially, in
accordance with the law and their consciences, and that they do not have to take
instructions from any person, not even the Chief Justice. They enjoy security of
tenure until retirement unless they are found guilty of serious misconduct or
inability, and are protected by the requirement of due process of law in case of
disciplinary action being taken against them. Thus, judges have every reason to
exercise their independence.
Before the genocide of 1994, Rwanda experienced economic decline.
According to experts, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita declined 1.5%
annually between 1982 and 1992. However, after the stability that followed the
end of the war and genocide, the economy started bouncing back—growth
averaged 8.1% annually between 1995 and 2000, and income poverty levels were
reduced by 18%.35 Rwanda continues to enjoy political stability and increasing
economic growth. This is a considerable achievement for a poor country that has
emerged from almost total social, economic, and moral collapse following the
1994 genocide. The stability and economic growth has, among other factors,
been due to confidence in the country fostered by good governance, commitment
to the rule of law, and judicial independence on the part of the post-genocide
government of national unity.
VI. CHALLENGES TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
There is still a problem with financial autonomy of the judiciary and the
financial security of judges. This is not because the government would not like to
make the constitutional promise of financial independence a reality. The problem
is that the “national cake” is too small compared to the real needs of the country.
The judiciary receives less than 1% of the budget. The bulk of the budget goes to
arguably more urgent social needs, with education at 17% and health at 8%. A
bigger budget would bring justice closer to the people and make its delivery
faster and more efficient, but there is not enough money to go around. The
country would like its judges to be paid a decent salary that is competitive with
earnings of lawyers in private practice and in other employment so that they can
live comfortably without the temptation of corruption or the need to do other
work on the side. Judges, especially in the lower courts, struggle to divide their
pay to accommodate the basic necessities of life: food for their families; shelter;
transportation; and education for their children. Only their sense of dignity and
commitment to justice helps them resist the temptation of corruption. They know
that they are in the same boat as other hard-working Rwandan public servants
working for a good cause. At the same time, it is hoped that whenever it becomes

35. ALISON EVANS ET AL., INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF RWANDA’S POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY
2002-2005 (2006), available at http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/Rwanda_PRSP.pdf.
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possible for the government to save money, it will remember the judiciary as
being crucial to stability and prosperity, and will improve the conditions of
judges. It is sometimes felt that the judiciary is forgotten or regarded as not being
a priority when allocating scarce resources because it cannot show the tangible
benefits as compared to other services.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that judicial independence is a crucial factor in stabilizing
society and in promoting investment and economic growth. It is necessary that
legal infrastructure be put in place to ensure that judicial independence is
maintained, and to reassure investors and others involved in economic activities
that their property and investments will be safe. Developing countries have a
short history of democracy, respect for the rule of law, and independence of the
judiciary. These countries, however, are making strides in that direction. This
should create a climate where the rule of law and judicial independence thrive,
and economic confidence exists so that development can be achieved and
sustained for the benefit of the people.
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